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Abstract
We use household survey data to construct a direct measure of absolute risk aversion
based on the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay to buy a risky security. We relate
this measure to consumers’ endowment and attributes and to measures of background risk
and liquidity constraints. We ¿nd that risk aversion is a decreasing function of endowment -
thus rejecting CARA preferences - but the elasticity to consumption is far below the unitary
value predicted by the CRRA utility. We also ¿nd that households’ attributes are of little
help in predicting their degree of risk aversion, which is characterized by massive unexplained
heterogeneity. However, the consumers’ environment affects risk aversion. Individuals who
are more likely to face income uncertainty or to become liquidity constrained exhibit a higher
degree of absolute risk aversion, consistent with recent theories of attitudes towards risk in the
presence of uninsurable risks.
JEL  Classi¿cation:  D10,  D80.
Keywords:  heterogeneous  preferences,  risk  tolerance,  background  risk,  liquidity
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1
The relationship between a consumer’s attitude towards risk, as indicated for instance by
the degree of absolute risk aversion or of absolute risk tolerance, and wealth is central to many
¿elds of economics. Kenneth Arrow argued as long as 35 years ago that “the behavior of these
measures as wealth varies is of the greatest importance for prediction of economic reactions in
the presence of uncertainty” (p. 35).
Most of the inference on the nature of this relation is based on common sense,
introspection, casual observation of behavioral differences between the rich and the poor and
a priori reasoning, and concerns the sign of the relation, whereas no evidence at all, even
indirect, is available on its curvature. The consensus view is that absolute risk aversion should
decline with wealth.
2 Furthermore, if one agrees that preferences are characterized by constant
relative risk aversion - a property of one of the most commonly used utility functions, the
isoelastic - then absolute risk aversion is decreasing and convex in wealth, while risk tolerance
is increasing and linear. The curvature of absolute risk tolerance has been shown to be relevant
in a number of contexts. For instance, Gollier and Zeckhauser (1997) show that it determines
whether the portfolio share invested in risky assets increases or decreases over the consumer
life cycle, an issue that is receiving increasing attention. Moreover, if risk toleranceis concave,
wealth inequality can help elucidate the risk premium puzzle (Gollier, 2001a). Furthermore,
the curvature of risk tolerance and the nature of risk aversion may explain why the marginal
propensity to consume out of current resources, rather than being constant, declines as the
level of resources increases (Carroll and Kimball, 1996, and Gollier, 2001b).
4 We thank Chris Carroll, Christian Gollier, Michaelis Haliassos, Wilko Letterie, Winfried Koeniger, John
Pratt, Andrea Tiseno and Richard Zeckhauser for very valuable discussion and suggestions. We are also greateful
to participants at seminars at Birbeck College, City University London, European University Institute, University
of Leuven, Ente Luigi Einaudi lunch seminars, Rand Corporation, Universidad Carlos III, the TMR conference
“Savings, pensions, and portfolio choice”, Deidesheim, the NBER 2000 Summer institute “Aggregate implica-
tions of microeconomic consumption behavior”, the 27th EGRIE meeting for helpful comments. Luigi Guiso
acknowledges ¿nancial support from MURST, and the EEC for the TMR research project “Specialisation versus
diversi¿cation: theMicroeconomics of RegionalDevelopmentandtheSpatial Propagation of Shocks in Europe”.
Cristiana Rampazzi provided excellent research assistantship. Only the authors are responsible for the contents
of this paper which does not re￿ect the Community’s opinion, nor the Bank of Italy’s.
5 It is on these grounds that quadratic and exponential utility, though often analytically convenient, are
regarded as misleading representations of preferences￿ the ¿rst implies increasing absolute risk aversion while
the second posits it is constant.8
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the nature of the relationship
between risk aversion and wealth. Using data from the Bank of Italy Survey of Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW), we employ the information on household willingness to pay for
a risky security to recover a measure of the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion of the
consumer lifetime utility function and relate it to indicators of consumers’ endowment, as well
as to a set of demographic characteristics to control for individual preference heterogeneity.
The usual de¿nition of risk aversion and tolerance developed by Arrow (1970) and Pratt
(1964) is based on the assumption that initial wealth is non-random. It is also constructed in
a static setting or in settings where full access to the credit market is assumed. Recently, it
has been shown that attitudes towards risk can be affected by the prospect of being liquidity-
constrained and by the presence of additional uninsurable, non-diversi¿able risks. Gollier
(2000b) shows that the possibility that consumers will be subject to a liquidity constraint in the
futuremakesthem lesswillingtobear riskpresently, i.e. increases their riskaversion. Pratt and
Zeckhauser (1987), Kimball (1993) and Eekhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) establish a
set of conditions on preferences that de¿ne classes of utility functions whose common feature
is that the presence of background risk makes the individual behave in a more risk-averse
manner. They call these classes of utility functions “proper”, “standard”and“risk vulnerable”,
respectively.
3 The main implication is that even if risks are independent, individuals will react
to background risk by reducing their exposure to avoidable risks. One important consequence
is that individuals facing high exogenous labor income risk - which is normally uninsurable
- will be more risk-averse and thus avoid exposure to portfolio risk by holding less or no
risky assets. Similarly, they tend to buy more insurance against the risks that are insurable
(Eekhoudt and Kimball, 1992).
4 Furthermore, insofar as income risk evolves with age, under
standardness, background risk may help explain thelife cycle of asset holdings. Several papers
6 Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) de¿neas “proper” the classof utility functionsthat ensure thatintroducingan
additional independent undesirablerisk when another undesirable one is already present makes the consumer less
willing to accept the extra risk. Kimball (1993) de¿nes as “standard” the class of utility functions that guarantee
that an additional independent undesirable risk increases the sensitivity to other loss-aggravating ones. Starting
from initial wealth z,ar i s kh { is undesirable if and only if it satis¿es Hx+z ￿ h {, ￿ x+z,,w h e r ex+z, is an
increavlqg and concave utility function. A risk h { is loss-aggravating if and only if it satis¿es Hx3+z . h {, ￿
x3+z, . When absolute risk aversion is decreasing, every undesirable risk is loss-aggravating, but not every loss-
aggravating risk is undesirable. Finally, risk vulnerability in Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) implies
that adding a zero-mean background risk makes consumers more risk averse.
7 Guiso, JappelliandTerlizzese(1996)¿ndthathouseholdsfacinggreaterearnings riskbuylessriskyassets￿
Guiso and Jappelli (1998) show that households buy more liability insurance in response to earnings risk.9
have cited background risk and risk vulnerability (or standardness) to explain the portfolio
puzzles.
5 In all these studies, standardness or risk vulnerability is just assumed, but it is not
tested because of lack of evidence on individual risk aversion.
The evidence presented in this paper also sheds light on the empirical relevance of these
concepts. The availability of information on measures of background risk and on proxies of
borrowing constraints allows us to relate our index of risk aversion to indicators of income-
related risk and of liquidity constraints.
Our ¿ndings show that absolute risk tolerance is an increasing and concave function of
consumers’ resources: thus, we reject both CARA and CRRA preferences. Furthermore, we
¿nd that risk aversion is positively affected by background risk, as well as by the possibility of
being credit constrained. Our estimates, however, show that these variables can only explain a
small amount of the sample variability in attitudes towards risk. Even after controlling for
individual characteristics there remains a large amount of unexplained variation re￿ecting
partly genuine differences in tastes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our measure of risk
aversion when wealth is non-random and when there is background risk. Section 3 presents
descriptive evidence on absolute risk aversion in our cross-section of households. In Section 4
we discuss the empirical speci¿cation we use to relate absolute risk aversion to the consumer
endowment, attributes and then environment. Section 5 presents the results of the estimates.
In Section 6 we check the robustness of the main ¿ndings to the endogeneity of consumption
and wealth, non-responses and the possible presence of outliers. Section 7 presents evidence
regarding the effects of background risk on the propensity to bear risk. Section 8 discusses the
consistency with observed behavior of our ¿ndings on the shape of the wealth-risk aversion
relation. Section 9 summarizes and concludes.
2. Measuring risk aversion
To measure absolute risk aversion and tolerance we exploit the 1995 wave of the Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which is run biannually by the Bank of Italy. The
1995 SHIW collects data on income, consumption, real and ¿nancial wealth, and on several
8 See Weil (1992), Gollier and Zeckhauser (1997), Gollier (2000), Coco et al. (1998), Heaton and Lucas
(2000).10
demographic variables for a representative sample of 8,135 Italian households. Balance-sheet
items are end-of-period values. Income and ￿ow variables refer to 1995.
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The 1995 wave has a section designed to elicit attitudes towards risk. Each participant
is offered a hypothetical security and is asked to report the maximum price that he would be
willing to pay for it. Speci¿cally:
“We would like to ask you a hypothetical question that you should answer as
if the situation were a real one. You are offered the opportunity of acquiring a
security permitting you, with the same probability, either to gain 10 million lire or
to lose all the capital invested. What is the most that you would be prepared to pay
for this security?”
Ten million lire is equal to just over 5,000 euros (or roughly $5,000). The ratio of the
expected gain from the investment to average household total consumption is 16 percent￿ thus,
the investment represents a relatively large risk. We consider this to be an advantage since
expected utility maximizers behave as risk-neutral individuals with respect to small risks even
if they are risk-averse to larger risks (Arrow, 1970). Thus, putting consumers face to face
with a relatively large investment is a better strategy to elicit risk attitudes when one relies,
as we do, on expected utility maximization to characterize risk aversion.
7 The interviews
are conducted personally at the consumer’s home by professional interviewers. To help the
respondent understand the question, the interviewers show an illustrative card and are ready
to provide explanations. The respondent can answer in one of three ways: a) declare the
maximum amount he is willing to pay for the security, which we denote ~￿￿ b) answer “don’t
know”￿ c) not answer.
Noticethat theway thehypotheticalsecurity isdesigned impliesthat with probability 1/2
the respondent gets 10 million lire and with probability 1/2 he loses ~￿￿ So the expected value
of the lottery is ￿*2E￿f ￿ ~￿￿￿ Clearly, ~￿ ￿ ￿f million lire, ~￿ = ￿f,a n d~￿ : ￿f million lire
imply risk aversion, risk neutrality and risk loving, respectively. This characterizes attitudes
9 See the appendix for a detailed description of the survey contents, its sample design, interviewing proce-
dure and response rates.
: In this vein, Rabin (2000) argues that if an expected utility maximizer refuses a small risk at all levels
of wealth then he must clearly exhibit unrealistic levels of risk aversion when faced with large-scale risks. This
again suggests that offering large investments is a better way to characterize the risk aversion of expected utility
maximizers.11
towards risk qualitatively. But we can do more￿ within the expected utility framework a
measure of the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion can be obtained for each consumer.
Let ￿￿ denote household ￿￿r endowment, which for a moment is assumed to be non-random.
Let ￿￿E￿￿ be its (lifetime) utility function and h ￿￿ be the random return on the security for
individual ￿, taking values 10 million and ￿~￿ with equal probability. The maximum purchase
price is thus given by:
￿￿E￿￿￿’
￿
2
￿￿E￿￿ n ￿f￿ n
￿
2
￿￿E￿￿ ￿ ~￿￿’.￿￿E￿￿ n h ￿￿￿c (1)
where . is the expectations operator. Taking a second-order Taylor expansion of the right-
hand side of (1) around ￿￿ gives:
.￿￿E￿￿ n h ￿￿￿ f ￿￿E￿￿￿n￿
￿
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Substituting (2) into (1) and simplifying we obtain:
-￿E￿￿￿ f ￿￿
￿￿
￿ E￿￿￿*￿
￿
￿E￿￿￿’e E D￿ ~￿*2￿*
￿
￿f
2 n ~
2
￿
￿
￿ (3)
Equation (3) uniquely de¿nes the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion in terms of
the parameters of the hypothetical security of the survey. Absolute risk tolerance is de¿ned
by A￿E￿￿￿’￿ *-￿E￿￿￿. Obviously, for risk-neutral individuals (i.e. those reporting ~￿ ’￿ f ),
-￿E￿￿￿’fand forthe risk-prone (thosewith~￿ : ￿f), -￿E￿￿￿ ￿ f. According to (3) absolute
risk aversion may vary with consumer endowment and with all the attributes correlated with
his preferences. Notice that since the loss ~￿ or the gain from the investment need not be
fully borne by or bene¿t current consumption but may be spread over lifetime consumption,
our measure of risk aversion is better interpreted as the risk aversion of the consumer lifetime
utility and ￿ as his lifetime wealth.
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A few comments on this measure and on how it compares with those used in other
studies are in order. First, our measure requires no assumption on the form of the individual
utility function, which is left unspeci¿ed. Second, it is not restricted to risk-averse individuals
; Tiseno (2002) studies the relationship between the risk aversion of lifetimeutility and thatof period utility
and shows how one can recover the latter given information on the curvature of the former and on the slope of
the consumption function. He also shows that knowledge of the maximum subjective price function for a risk is
suf¿cient to identify the risk aversion of a consumer lifetime utility.12
but extends to the risk-neutral and the risk lovers. Third, our de¿nition provides a point
estimate, rather than a range, of the degree of risk aversion for each individual in the sample.
These features distinguish our study from that of Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro (1997)
who only obtain a range measure of (relative) risk aversion and a point estimate under the
assumption that preferences are strictly risk-averse and utility is of the CRRA type. More,
their sample consists of individuals aged 50 or over, which makes it hard not only to study the
age pro¿le of risk aversion but also to test its relationship with background risk since this is
likely to matter most for the young. The study of this relationship is instead one of the aims
of our paper. However, their elicitation strategy allows them to recover a measure of the risk
aversion of period utility instead of lifetime utility as we do. In this regard, our and their study
should be viewed as complementary.
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2.1 Risk aversion with background risk
The measure of risk aversion in (3) is for non-random endowment, but it is easily
generalized to the case of background risk using the results of Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams
(1981) and Kimball (1993). For this purpose we have to restrict the analysis to risk-averse
individuals (i.e. those reporting ~￿ ￿ ￿f).
Let h +￿ denote a zero-mean background risk for individual ￿, whose variance is j2.
Denoting with .% E% ’ +c￿) the expectation with respect to the random variable h %, our
indifference condition for purchasing the risky security and paying ~￿ becomes
.+￿￿E￿￿ n h +￿￿’.￿.+￿￿E￿￿ n h +￿ n h ￿￿￿c (4)
where we have implicitly assumed that the background risk and the risky security are
independent, which is assured by construction. If preferences are risk-vulnerable as in Gollier
and Pratt (1996), we can use the equivalence:
.+￿￿E￿￿ n h +￿￿’￿￿E￿￿￿c (5)
< The Barsky et al. (1997) measure of risk aversion has other advantages. Since the risk tolerance question
is asked in two waves of the survey they use and a subset of the respondents is common to both waves, they can
account for measurement errors in their measure of relative risk aversion. Furthermore, they collect information
on intertemporal substitution and can thus study its relation to risk aversion.13
where ￿￿E￿￿￿ is a concave transformation of ￿￿, which implies that ￿￿E￿￿￿ is more risk-averse
than ￿￿E￿￿￿. In other words, if consumers ￿ and ￿ are both risk-averse and their preferences
are risk-vulnerable, then, assuming ￿￿ ’ ￿￿, ￿ is more risk-averse than ￿ if h +￿ is riskier than
h +￿, i.e. if the background risk is greater.
We can thus account for background risk by expressing our measure of risk aversion in
terms of the utility function ￿￿E￿￿￿ to get
-￿E￿￿￿ f ￿￿
￿￿
￿ E￿￿￿*￿
￿
￿E￿￿￿ ’ eED ￿~￿*2￿*
￿
￿f
2 n ~
2
￿
￿
￿ (6)
Risk aversion will now vary not only with the consumer’s endowment and attributes but also
with any source of uncertainty characterizing the environment. If measures of the latter are
available, one can directly test for standardness of preferences.
Interestingly, the shape of the relation between - (or risk tolerance) and ￿ can have
implications for the sign of the effect of background risk on absolute risk aversion. Hennessy
and Lapan (1998) show that a positive and concave relation of risk tolerance with wealth is
suf¿cient for preferences to be standard as in Kimball (1993). Similarly, Eekhoudt, Gollier,
and Schlesinger (1996) show that a suf¿cient (but not necessary) condition for absolute risk
aversion to increase with background risk is that it should be a decreasing and convex function
of the endowment, an assumption that is satis¿ed, for instance, by the CRRA utility. Gollier
and Pratt (1996) argue that the convexity of absolute risk aversion should be regarded as a
natural assumption
10, “since it means that the wealthier an agent is, the smaller is the reduction
in risk premium of a small risk for a given increase in wealth”. Though plausible, this assertion
is not backed by any empirical evidence. Our results lend support to this conjecture in that
they imply that absolute risk aversion is a convex function of the endowment. In Section 4,
we will discuss the implications for the relation between risk aversion of ￿E￿ and the level of
endowment from the relation between the risk aversion of ￿E￿ and the endowment.
3. Descriptive evidence
The question on the risky security was submitted to the whole sample of 8,135 heads
of household, but only 3,458 answered and were willing to purchase the security. Out of the
43 Notice that if consumers are risk-averse at all levels of wealth and if absolute risk aversion is a strictly
decreasing function of wealth, then absolute risk aversion must be convex in wealth.14
4,677 who did not, 1,586 answered “do not know” a n d3 , 0 9 1r e f u s e dt oa n s w e ro rt op a ya
positive price (25 offered more than 20 million). This is likely to be due to the complexity
of the question, which might have led some participants to skip it altogether because of the
relatively long time required to understand its meaning and provide an answer. Non-responses
are also a re￿ection of the fact that the question on the risky security was asked abruptly by the
interviewers, without preparing the respondents with a set of “warm up” questions. However,
this strategy has its advantages: ¿rst, depending on how the introductory questions are framed
and when they are asked, they may end up affecting the answers, thus distorting the measure
o ft h et r u ep r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e r ￿ this is avoided by asking the question abruptly. Second, it
avoids bringing in noisy respondents (e.g. those with a poor understanding of the question),
as would probably happen with “warm up” questions. Thus, while a high non-response rate
signals that the question is complex and there may be cognitive problems, it does not mean that
those who chose to respond gave erroneous answers. On the contrary, if those who answered
did so because they had a good understanding of the question (or the time to grasp and answer
it), the elicitation strategy with no “warm up” questions might have been an effective way to
get rid of noisy respondents.
Oneway to assess whether the risk-aversion measure re￿ects just noiseor revealsinstead
the risk attitudes of the individual, is to check whether it has predictive power over consumer
choices that theory predicts should be affected by individuals’ risk aversion. Guiso and Paiella
(2001)showthatoursurveymeasureofrisk aversionhasconsiderablepredictivepowerofsuch
behaviors as occupation choice, risky asset ownership and portfolio allocation, willingness to
move and change job, as well as health status, in ways that are consistent with what the theory
predicts. On the basis of probit regressions with standard socio-economic controls, the risk-
averse turn out to be signi¿cantly less likely to be self-employed, are somewhat more likely
to be public employees and are less likely to change job than the risk-neutral and risk lovers.
Further, the probability of holding risky assets, i.e. private bonds, stocks and mutual funds,
is less than half as great among risk-averse consumers than among the risk-neutral and risk-
lovers. Based on this evidence we feel con¿dent that despite the extent of non-responses, the
risk attitude indicator captures the individual willingness of the respondents to bear risk.
11
44 This is not to say that our measure of risk aversion is free of measurement error. However, if this is of the
classical type, it will not affect the consistency of our results as we discuss in Section 4.15
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the whole sample of 8,135 households, for the
sample of 3,458 respondents to the risky security question and, for the latter, for several sub-
samples. Out of 3,458 individuals willing to purchase the security the great majority (96
percent) are risk averse, in that they report a maximum price lower than the gain offered by the
security￿ 144individualsareeitherrisk-neutral(125, or3.6 percentofthesample), orrisk-lover
(19, only a tiny minority). The table reports characteristics for these three sub-samples too.
Those who responded to the question are on average 6 years younger than the total sample and
have higher shares of male-headed households (79.8 compared to 74.4 percent), of married
people (78.9 and 72.5 percent, respectively), of self-employed (17.9 and 14.2 percent) and
of public sector employees (27.5 and 23.3 percent, respectively). They are also somewhat
wealthier and slightly better educated (1.3 more years of schooling). These differences seem
to suggest that there are some systematic effects explaining the willingness to respond. Probit
regressions, reported in the Appendix (column (1) and (2) of the table), con¿rm this factual
evidence and suggest that the probability of answering the question is higher among younger
and more educated households. Public employees and the self-employed are also relatively
more likely to respond. Further, the response probability increases in household income, but
decreases with net worth. In our estimates we control for the possibility that non-responses
induce selection bias.
The sub-samples of risk-lovers and risk-neutral, on the one hand, and risk-averse
consumers, on the other, exhibit several interesting differences. The risk-averse are younger
and less educated￿ they are less likelyto be male, to be married andto live in the North of Italy.
Strong differences also emerge comparing the type of occupation: among the risk-averse the
share of self-employed is 17.4 percent￿ among the risk-prone or risk-neutral it is much higher
at 29.2 percent. This orderingisreversed forpublicsectoremployees. Therisk-lovers and risk-
neutral are public employees in 27 percent of cases, while the risk-averse in 28 percent. These
differences are likely to re￿ect self-selection, with more risk-averse individuals choosing safer
jobs. Finally, notice that the risk-averse are signi¿cantly less wealthy than the risk-lovers or
risk-neutral (170 million lire - 88,000 euros - of median net worth compared with 330 million
- 170,000 euros).
Table 1 also reports the characteristics of the moderately risk-averse consumers (at or
below the sample median of the reported price ~￿) and of the high risk-averse (above median).16
Highly risk-averse consumers are on average two years older, somewhat less well educated,
less likely to be married and much more likely to live in the South. They are also less wealthy
than the moderately risk-averse, both in terms of net worth, ¿nancial wealth and consumption
(the median net worth of the two groups is 154.9 and 198.5 million lire, respectively). Finally,
the share of self-employed is 15.6 percent for the highly risk-averse and 20.1 percent for the
moderately risk averse￿ that of public sector employees is 28.3 and 26.3 percent. Thus, being
risk-averse as opposed to risk-lover or risk-neutral, as well as differences in the degree of risk
aversion seem to explain sorting into riskier occupations.
4. Empirical speci¿cation
Most of the literature assumes that agents are risk-averse and is interested in assessing
how risk aversion varies with the consumer’s attributes and in particular with his endowment.
Accordingly, the next four sections focus on risk-averse individuals.
To estimate the relation between our index of absolute risk aversion and the individual
endowment we use the following speci¿cation (we omit the household index ￿ for brevity):
-E￿￿’
@e￿Mn#
￿q ’
V
￿qc (7)
where ￿ denotes the (lifetime) endowment, M is a vector of consumer characteristics affecting
individual preferences, # is a random shock to preferences, @ is a constant and ￿ and q are two
unknown parameters.
12 Equation (7) is a generalization of absolute risk aversion under CRRA
preferences￿ the latter obtain when q = 1 in which case V ’ @e￿Mn# measures relative risk
aversion. Notice that -E￿ is always positive and is decreasing in ￿ for all positive values of q.
Furthermore, if q:0, it is always convex in ￿. Though simple, this formulation is ￿exible
enough to allow us to analyze the curvature of absolute risk tolerance, which is de¿ned as:
AE￿￿’V
3￿￿
q￿ (8)
Thus, if q:0, risk tolerance is an increasing function of ￿￿ furthermore, it will be concave,
linear or convex in ￿ depending on whether q is less than, equal to or greater than 1. Since
45 Notice that our empirical speci¿cation (7) does not allow for heterogeneity in the ￿ parameter. If ￿ varies
across individuals our estimates would be affected by heteroschedasticity. However, a formal test cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the error term is homoschedastic.17
q measures the speed at which -E￿ declines with endowment, AE￿ is a concave (respectively
convex) function of ￿ if absolute risk aversion falls as consumption increases more slowly
(respectively faster) than that characterizing CRRA preferences. Since most theoretical
ambiguities rest on the curvature of A, not -, our approach is not restrictive.
Although equation (7) is assumed, a utility function that gives rise to a measure of
absolute risk aversion as in (7) is
￿E￿￿’
]
e
3 @e￿Mn# h ￿￿3q
￿3q _h ￿ ’
]
e
3 V h ￿￿3q
￿3q _h ￿c (9)
which converges to the CRRA utility ￿E￿￿’￿￿3V
￿3V as q tends to 1.
Taking logs on both sides of (8), our empirical speci¿cation becomes:
*L}EA￿’￿*L}V n q *L}￿ ’ ￿*L} @￿ ￿M n q *L}￿ ￿#￿ (10)
The curvature of absolute risk tolerance as well as the relation between absolute risk aversion
and the endowment is thus parameterized by the value of q. We focus our discussion on risk
tolerance, rather than risk aversion, because the former aggregates cleanly in the presence of
heterogeneity, as shown by Breeden (1979).
As pointed out earlier, when background risk, h +, is present our measure of risk aversion
must be interpreted as measuring the risk aversion of the indirect lifetime utility function
￿E￿￿’.￿E￿ n h +￿￿ The question that arises is whether we can draw implications for the
relation between the risk aversion of ￿E￿ and the level of the endowment from the relation
between the risk aversion of ￿E￿ and the endowment.
13 In the Appendix we show that taking
a second order Taylor expansion of the indirect utility function around ￿ yields the following
index of the absolute risk aversion of this approximated utility:
-￿E￿cr￿’V￿
3qd
￿nR￿|￿r2*2
￿nR￿o￿r2*2
oc
where V is a constant, r is the coef¿cient of variation of the consumer’s endowment and o￿, R￿
and |￿ denote, respectively, the degree of relative risk aversion, relative prudence and relative
46 Theindirectutility function inherits severalproperties of x+,= Inparticular, if x+, isDARAthen y+, isalso
DARA. Furthermore, as shown by Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams (1981), comparative risk aversion is preserved
by the indirect utility if x+, exhibits non-increasing risk aversion.18
tolerance of the utility function ￿E￿.
14 Notice that V￿3q is the absolute risk aversion of ￿E￿ and
that -￿E￿cr￿ :V ￿ 3q if, given r:f and assuming the consumer is prudent (i.e. R￿ : f￿,
relativerisk toleranceislargerthanrelativerisk aversion. Furthermore, sincethetermin square
brackets is increasing in rc -￿E￿ too is increasing in r. Taking logs of its inverse and using the
relations between o￿, R￿,a n d|￿ spelled out in the Appendix, when there is background risk
our empirical speci¿cation for risk tolerance becomes
*L}EA￿￿’￿*L}V n q *L}￿ ￿Br
2c (11)
where B ’ qR￿. This formulation allows us to test directly whether background risk affects
risk attitudes. It requires two conditions to hold: consumers must be prudent (R￿ : f￿ and risk
aversion must be decreasing (q:f￿￿
5. Results
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of equation (10) using different measures
of consumer resources. The analysis is conducted on the sample of risk-averse consumers.
Possible misinterpretations of the survey question, as well as dif¿culties in ¿guring out the
maximum price to be paid suggest that the left-hand-side variable, *L}EA￿￿, is likely to suffer
measurement error. This will be re￿ected in the residual # but, in-so-far as it is uncorrelated
with the explanatory variables in equation (10), it will not lead to bias but only to a loss of
ef¿ciency. Furthermore, we control for sample selection related to non-response by including
among theregressorstheMillsratio based ontheprobitmodelfortheprobabilityofresponding
to the survey question, reported in the Appendix (columns (3) and (4) of the table), which
includes among theregressorsonly variablesthat can beexpected to be exogenouswith respect
to the individual attitude towards risk.
Since our measure of risk tolerance is best interpreted as the risk tolerance of the
consumer’s value function, in order to estimate the value of q one needs information on the
value of a consumer lifetime endowment. The latter is typically non-observable. To overcome
this problem we use household consumption which is readily available in the SHIW. In a life
cycle/permanent income context, consumption expenditure is a suf¿cient statistic for lifetime
resources as perceived by the consumer: thus, it is the best guess of unobservable lifetime
47 See the Appendix for the de¿nition of relative prudence and tolerance.19
endowment. However, we also check our results using as proxies for the endowment measures
of accumulated ¿nancial and total wealth and human wealth, as measured by income.
Assuming that consumption is proportional to the endowment ￿,i . e . S ’ b￿, our
empirical speci¿cation becomes
*L}EA￿￿’￿*L}V
￿ n q *L}S ￿ Br
2c (12)
where V￿ ’ Vb￿ The ¿rst set of results that we present ignores the potential endogeneity of
consumption and wealth as they are themselves affected by preference parameters. In the
¿rst column of Table 2 we report the results from the regression of ,J}EA￿￿ only on (log)
non-durable expenditure and do not include any consumer characteristics that can proxy for
differences in tastes. The estimate of q is 0.0922 and is highly statistically signi¿cant leading
to the rejection of preferences with constant absolute risk aversion. The estimated value of q
implies that absolute risk aversion declines with wealth but at a rate that is far slower than that
implied by constant relative risk aversion preferences. In fact, the hypothesis that q = 1 can be
strongly rejected (8 =1,584). It follows that absolute risk tolerance is a concave function of
consumer resources.
In the second column of the table we include a set of strictly exogenous individual
characteristics, such as age, gender, education attainment (a dummy equal to 1 if the head
of the household has completed eighth grade), and dummies for the presence of siblings and
for the region of birth. If tastes are impressed in our chromosomes or evolve over life in a
systematic way or depend on one’s education
15 or are affected by the culture of the place of
birth or by the possibility of relying on the support of a brother or sister, then these variables
should have predictive power. Theanalysis shows that only education and the region of birth in
fact do, with risk aversion being higher among the least educated. Being male has a negative
effect on the degree of risk aversion, but it is not statistically signi¿cant. Furthermore, a
test of the hypothesis that the coef¿cients on age, gender, education and siblings are jointly
equal to zero cannot be rejected at the standard levels of signi¿cance (8 = D.50, R-value =
48 Education can depend to some extent on the individual attitude towards risk, especially when it comes to
enrollment in higher education. Hence, in the regressions we control only for eighth grade attainment, which can
be considered exogenous and determined by factors that are independent of the individual attitude towards risk .20
0.2400). Finally, thejoint signi¿cance of the 19regional dummies
16 included in the regression,
capturing the region of birth, cannot be rejected (see the bottom of Table 2). Furthermore, the
coef¿cients on these dummies (not shown) reveal a pattern: compared with those born in the
central and southern regions, consumers born in the North are somewhat less risk-averse. One
possible interpretation is that the dummies are capturing regional differences in culture, which
are transmitted by upbringing. In addition to these variables, we insert in the regression also
twodummiesfortheoccupationofthefatherofthehousehold head: the¿rst dummyisequal to
1 if the consumer’s father is/was self-employed (zero otherwise)￿ the second dummy is equal
to 1 if he is/was a public sector employee (zero otherwise). This allows us to test whether
parents’attitudes towards risk - as re￿ected in their occupation choice - are transmitted to their
children. The estimates show that none of these variables has a signi¿cant effect on the degree
of risk aversion, although the signs on the dummies turn out as expected and imply relatively
lower (higher) risk tolerance among those individuals whose father was a public employee
(self-employed), which can be thought of as symptomatic of greater (lower) aversion to risk.
The last two columns of the table report a set of results based on other proxies of the
endowment: the ¿rst consists of total wealth, which is de¿ned as the sum of real and ¿nancial
assets, net of debt, and household income (excluding asset income), which proxies for human
wealth￿ the second consists of just the liquid component of household wealth, i.e. ¿nancial
assets plus household income (excluding asset income). The basic ¿ndings are con¿rmed:
absolute risk tolerance is an increasing and concave function of wealth (total or liquid) and
CRRA preferences are strongly rejected. The estimated elasticity of absolute risk aversion to
total wealth is lower than to consumption, whereas that to liquid wealth is not signi¿cantly
different. In all cases most of the variance of observed risk tolerance is left unexplained, as
the low -2￿r show, suggesting that most of the taste heterogeneity across consumers cannot
be accounted for by the set of exogenous variables that we observe. The estimated relation
between absolute risk tolerance and consumer resources is consistent with Arrow’s (1965)
hypothesis that absolute risk aversion should decrease as the endowment increases while
relative risk aversion should increase: but the latter is consistent with the former only if the
wealth elasticity of absolute risk aversion is less than one, as our ¿ndings indicate.
49 Italy is divided into 20 regions and 95 provinces. The latter correspond broadly to US counties. We will
usetheprovincialpartitioninginSection7wherewelookattheeffectof backgroundriskandliquidityconstraints
on risk aversion.21
The Mills ratio, which has been included in all regressions to correct for any selection
bias due to systematic non-response, has a small insigni¿cant coef¿cient, which suggests that
self-selection is unlikely to be an issue and lack of control should not bias the estimated q.
The results in the ¿rst two columns of Table 2 have been obtained assuming that
consumption is proportional to the endowment, so that the marginal propensity to consume out
of wealth is constant. There is a large literature that argues that, in the presence of uncertainty,
with prudentbehavior,themarginalpropensitytoconsumeislargeforlowvaluesofwealthand
tends to the (constant) perfect foresight value as wealth gets large (see Carroll and Kimball,
1996). Thus, consumption will be a concave function of the endowment, implying that the
estimated value of q in equation (12) will re￿ect not only the elasticity of the risk aversion of
lifetime utility to ￿, but also the elasticity of consumption to ￿. It is easy to show that if this
is the case our estimate of q is larger (in absolute terms) than the true value
17, implying that, if
anything, risk aversion declines with the endowment less fast than we estimate. Thus, without
knowledge of the consumption function we can only establish an upper bound for the value of
q￿
6. Robustness
6.1 Endogenous consumption and wealth
The results wehavereported so far do not takeinto account that consumption and wealth
are endogenous variables which are themselves affected by consumer preferences. Thus, the
estimated coef¿cients are potentially affected by endogeneity bias. The direction of the bias,
however, is not clear a priori. If more risk-averse individuals choose safer but less rewarding
prospects, they may end up poorer and consume less than the less risk-averse. This would tend
to overstate the positive relation between risk tolerance and wealth. However, if the more risk-
averse are also more prudent, ceteris paribus, they will compress current consumption, save
more and end up accumulating more assets.
18 In this case, our estimates of the relationship
4: To see this, let f @ f+z,z which implies z @ f
f+z,.H e n c e :￿orjz @ ￿+orjf ￿ orjf+z,,.W ec a n
then deal with this like with an omitted variable problem because it is as if we did not include in the regression
￿orjf+z,. The estimated coef¿cient on orjf will be given by h ￿=￿^4￿Fry+orjf>orjf+z,,@Y du+orjf,‘.S i n c e
the covariance is negative (the larger the level of consuption f, the smaller the propensity to consume the last unit
of wealth), h ￿A￿.
4; Riskaversionandprudenceusuallygotogether. Iftheutilityfunctionisexponential, absoluteriskaversion
and prudence are measured by the same parameter￿ if it is CRRA, absolute prudence is equal to absolute risk
aversion + 4@f￿ if preferences are described by equation (11) absolute prudence is equal to absolute risk aversion22
between risk toleranceand wealth will bebiased towards zero, which could partly explain why,
according to our estimates, risk tolerance increases only slightly as wealth increases.
19 On the
other hand, the relation between risk tolerance and consumption would be biased downward,
implying that the true elasticity of absolute risk aversion to consumption is even less than we
obtain.
To address this issue we re-estimate equation (10) with instrumental variables. Finding
appropriate instruments for consumption and wealth is no easy task. We rely on the following
sets of instruments. First, we use characteristics of the father of the head of the household,
namely his education and year of birth, on the ground that wealth is likely to be correlated
with that of one’s family, proxied by the father’s education and cohort. Second, we employ
measures of windfall gains, such as a dummy for the house being acquired as a result of a
bequest or gift, the value of insurance settlements and other transfers that have been received
and an estimate of the capital gain on the house since the time of acquisition. Overall, the
instruments explain around 30 percent of the variance of (log) non-durable consumption and
of (log) total wealth and over 25 percent of the variance of (log) liquid wealth.
Table 3 shows the results when consumption, total wealth and liquid wealth are used.
We report the speci¿cation including age, gender, education, siblings, occupation of the father
of the head of the household and region of birth. Since for some agents the information on
their parents’ characteristics orsome otherinstruments wasmissing thesamplesizeis by about
300 observations smaller than for the OLS estimates.
20 When consumption and liquid wealth
are used as a measure of consumer endowment, the instrumental variable estimates result in
a larger estimate of the parameter q. For instance, when consumption is used the estimated
q is 0.1549, more than twice the OLS estimate. But the difference with respect to the OLS
+ ￿@f=
4< Anotherpossibleexplanationofourresultsis thepresenceofmeasurementerrorinconsumptionorwealth,
which is a potential source of attenuation bias. To verify whether attenuation is an issue, we have instrumented
c o n su m p t i o nw i t ht o t a lw e a l t ha n dw i t ht o t a la n dl i q u i dw e a l t ha n dh a v eo b t a i n e de s t i m a t e so f￿ e q u a lt o0 . 1 5a n d
0.20, respectively. Instrumenting total wealth with consumption and with consumption and liquid wealth yields
estimates of ￿ equal to 0.05 and 0.07, respectively. Finally, instrumenting liquid wealth with both consumption
and total wealth yields estimates of ￿ equal to 0.08. These results suggest that attenuation bias could in fact be
an issue, especially when measuring the endowment with total wealth and ¿nancial wealth, which are known to
be measured with error. However, overall, our conclusions do not change signi¿cantly.
53 Differences in results between the OLS and the IV estimates are not due to differences in the sample.
Using OLS on the smaller sample yields estimates of the parameters similar to those in Table 3.23
estimates does not change the previous conclusions: absolute risk aversion is a decreasing
function of wealth and both CARA and CRRA preferences are rejected. Figure 2 shows the
risk tolerance-consumption relation when the OLS and IV estimators are used: in both cases
the pro¿le is far from linear as would be the case under constant relative risk aversion.
To further verify the robustness of our results, we have estimated our basic instrumental
variable speci¿cation on a restricted reference sample of 2,200 households. This was obtained
from the sample of risk-averse consumers by excluding households with net worth below 20
million lire (623 observations), corresponding to twice the gain from our hypothetical security,
and with non-positive income (excluding asset income￿ 13 observations) (in fact, it could be
argued that responses are affected by the size of the risky prospect that individuals face)￿
those who reported non-positive ¿nancial assets (145 observations), in an attempt to take into
account mis-reporting and under-reporting of assets￿ and those who are either too young or too
old (below age 21 or above age 75, 57 observations) on the ground that dif¿culties in grasping
the lottery question should probably be concentrated at the two tails of the age distribution.
The results using consumption as a measure of the endowment, shown in the last column of
Table 3, con¿rm those obtained on the whole sample, shown in the ¿rst column, although the
estimate is hardly signi¿cant.
21
6.2 Quantile regressions
Finally, we check our results for departureof thedistribution of residualsfrom symmetry
by estimating least absolute deviation regressions using Amemyia (1982) two-stage estimator
to account for endogeneity bias. Given the considerable heterogeneity in the measure of risk
aversion, quantile regressions may help give a sense of the determinants of risk aversion
for the median consumer. In addition, unlike the conditional mean, quintiles are invariant
to monotonic transformations such as taking logs, as we do in equation (10), our empirical
speci¿cation. Table 4 shows the results from the estimation when non-durable consumption,
54 Another possibility is thatthe qualityofourindicatorofriskaversiondepends onthesizeoftheinvestment
relative to the resources of the consumer￿ in particular, it may be that the investment is too large for some
consumers making them unwilling to accept. Notice that the framing of the question is such that the consumer
chooses the maximum loss he is willing to incur, which he can choose as small as he wishes. To address this
issue further we have estimated our basic equation based on non-durable expenditure splitting the sample below
and above median wealth. Results are very similar to those for the whole group. The OLS estimate of ￿ is 0.06
for households with below median total wealth and 0.05 for those with above median wealth. Both coef¿cients
are statistically signi¿cant but we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal.24
total wealth and liquid wealth are alternatively used to measure the endowment.
22 The main
predictions of the OLS and IV analysis reported in Tables 2 and 3 are con¿rmed: for the
median consumer absolute risk aversion declines with the endowment and the sensitivity is
somewhat larger for consumption and liquid wealth than for total wealth. Furthermore, the
estimates of qc though signi¿cantly different from zero (contrary to CARA preferences) are
far below 1 in absolute value (rejecting the CRRA utility).
7. Risk aversion and background risk
In a world of incomplete markets the attitude towards risk, measured by the willingness
to accept a fair lottery, may vary between consumers not only because of differences in
taste parameters but also because they face different environments. In Section 2 we discuss
how risk aversion can be affected by background risk. In this Section we test whether the
attitudes towards risk are affected by the presence of uninsurable, independent risks and by
the possibility of being liquidity-constrained in the future. To measure background risk we
rely on per-capita GDP growth at the provincial level for the period 1952-1992, which we
use to compute a measure of the variability of GDP growth in the province of residence. For
each province we regress (log) GDP on a time trend and compute the residuals. We then
calculate the variance of the residuals and attach this estimate to all households living in the
same province. The main advantage of this variable compared with subjective measures of
future income uncertainty, such as those analyzed by Guiso, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2002),
is that it is likely to be truly exogenous and so, unlike the subjective measures which re￿ect
occupational choice, less subject to self-selection problems.
23 The variance of GDP growth in
the province is an estimate of aggregate risk and should be largely exogenous to the individual
risk attitude unless risk-averse consumers move to provinces with low variance GDP.
55 Notice that we do not control for sample selection because the Mills ratio accounts for shifts in the mean,
whereas the focus here is on the median.
56 The 1995 SHIW contains a special section in which households are asked a set of questions designed
to elicit the perceived probability of being employed over the twelve months following the interview and the
variation in earnings if employed. Guiso, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2002) use these data to obtain an estimate of
expected earnings and their variance. They show that the subjective variance is negatively correlated with a
dummy for risk aversion and interpret this as evidence of self-selection. When we use the subjective measure of
earning uncertainty as a proxy for background risk we ¿nd that its effect on risk tolerance is positive, small and
not statistically signi¿cant, showing that self-selection nulli¿es any background risk effect, which implies that
subjective measures are inadeguate to isolate the effect of background risk on an individual willingness to bear
risk.25
Table 5 reports the estimation results. The ¿rst column shows the estimates using this
proxy for background risk and consumption as scale variable.
24 The degree of risk tolerance is
decreasinginthevarianceof per-capitaGDP intheprovince ofresidence evenafter controlling
for age, gender, education, siblings, occupation of the father of the head of the household
and region of birth, and the effect is highly statistically signi¿cant. This is consistent with
background risk models: increasing our measure of background risk by one standard deviation
lowers absolute risk tolerance by about 3 percent. If risk-averse individuals tend to move from
high-variance to low-variance provinces, this would tend to generate a positive correlation
between risk tolerance and background risk￿ thus, the above is, if anything, a lower bound
(taken in absolute terms) of the true effect of background risk. The estimates are robust to a
cluster correction for province effects as well as to the use of wealth instead of consumption
to measure household resources.
25
A ss h o w ni nS e c t i o n4 ,t h ec o e f ¿cient of the background risk term is B ’ qR￿￿ if
f ￿q￿￿c as our analysis suggests, then R￿ ’ q n V￿E￿3q￿ and depends on the level of
consumption (see the Appendix). The estimates in column (1) ignore this interaction between
the level of endowment and background risk and the implied restrictions on the parameters q
and V. To tackle this issue we use a non-linear instrumental variable estimator imposing the
above de¿nition of R￿ and relative restrictions. More speci¿cally, we estimate the equation:
*L}A￿ ’ ￿*L}V n q *L}S ￿ qdq n VS
￿3qor
2c (13)
where V is parameterized as usual, as V=@e￿Mn#￿
26 The values of the estimated parameters are
reported in the second column of Table 5. The point estimate of q is 0.1335, which is not
signi¿cantly different from the coef¿cient of (log) consumption reported in column (1).
57 Notice that the dimension of this term is that of a coef¿cient of variation.
58 When the cluster correction is used the point estimate (which is obviously unchanged) of the coef¿cientof
the variance of the shocks to provincial GDP retains its signi¿cance. Whenwealthis usedinsteadofconsumption,
the point estimate is somewhat larger and estimated with greater precision. Results are also robust to the presence
of outliers: LAD estimation yields a somewhat lower, but more precisely estimated, coef¿cient of background
risk.
59 For estimation purposes, the term within square brakets is approximated as follows: ￿ . ￿f4￿￿ @ ￿ .
dh￿K.￿f4￿￿ ￿ ￿ . d3h￿Kf4￿￿ where d3 @ d+4 . 3=8￿5
￿, which is obtained by linearizing h￿ around the mean
of ￿￿ ￿5
￿ denotes the variance of ￿.26
The third column of Table 5 adds to our basic speci¿cation an indicator of liquidity
constraints. As argued by Gollier (2000), liquidity constraints act to reduce the consumer
horizon, thus limiting the opportunities to time-diversify any risk currently taken, accentuating
risk aversion. Our measure of risk aversion is based on the notion that it is liquidity constraints
that matter and the danger of their being caused by an inability to borrow and by impediments
to draw down accumulated assets in order to increase consumption.
27 Thus, the liquidity-
constrained are those who have been refused credit or have not asked believing their request
would be turned down (3 percent of the sample), or have a ratio of liabilities to total assets
above 25 percent (9 percent of the sample) or have ¿nancial assets representing less than 1
percent of net worth (17 percent of the sample). Overall, we classify as potentially liquidity-
constrained around 26 percent of the households in our sample of respondents. The estimated
coef¿cient of this indicator has the expected negative sign and is statistically signi¿cant,
implying that being liquidity-constrained (or in danger of becoming so) makes agents more
risk averse. Economically, being liquidity-constrained lowers risk tolerance by 4.4 percent.
This result is robust to the inclusion in the regression of the variance of provincial GDP,
as shown in the last column of the table, implying that background risk is not proxying for
liquidity constraints.
8. Consistency with observed behavior
If our ¿ndings on the relation between risk tolerance and wealth do indeed re￿ect
the structure of individual preferences, then this should be re￿ected in actual behavior￿ i.e.
observed behavior should be consistent with the shape of the measured risk-tolerance-wealth
relation. In this section we discuss some implications of our empirical characterization of
the wealth-risk-tolerance relation. First, if relative risk tolerance is decreasing in wealth, as
implied by our ¿ndings, the portfolio share of risky assets should decline as wealth increases.
Second, if, as our results suggest, absolute risk tolerance is a concave function of the consumer
endowment, the portfolio share of risky assets should be an increasing function of age. Third,
if our estimates do indeed identify the parameters of the consumers’ utility function, they
should be coherent with those based on the estimation of Euler equations for consumption.
5: If households have low liquid assets, it can be relatively dif¿cult to smooth consumption when confronted
with an unexpected negative income or expenditure shock. If liquid assets are low, to increase consumption
households might have to tap into their accumulated assets or ask for credit, which might be costly options.
Besides, if they are already heavily in debt, the cost of raising more credit might be very high. Hurst (2000)
provides further arguments for using this de¿nition of liquidity-constrained households.27
8.1 Wealth-portfolio relation
The ¿rst implication is clearly contradicted by the data since portfolio shares are found
to be an increasing function of wealth. This is obviously in contrast also with constant relative
risk aversion preferences. One strategy that has been pursued in the literature is to maintain
the CRRA characterization of the utility of consumption but to assume that wealth enters
the utility function directly as a luxury good, for instance through a joy-of-giving/bequest
motive. As Carroll (2000) shows, thisimpliesthat a larger proportion of lifetimewealth will be
devoted to the risky assets. Clearly, this mechanism can still explain the data even if the utility
function of consumption is characterized by increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA), provided
that the joy-of-giving motive is suf¿ciently strong. Another explanation is that there are
portfolio management costs that decline with the size of the investment in risky assets (which
is increasing in wealth)￿ if they are suf¿ciently important, this mechanism can overturn any
incentive to lower the portfolio share of risky assets coming from IRRA. A third possibility,
analyzed by Peress (2001), is that households face costs of acquiring ¿nancial information.
Since wealthier consumers tend to invest larger amounts in stocks they have more incentives
to invest in information acquisition. Being more informed, in turn, they tend to invest a larger
share than the less informed consumers and this mechanism can again counteract the tendency
of the portfolio share to decrease due to IRRA. Thus, our results do not, in principle, con￿ict
with the evidence.
8.2 Age-portfolio pro¿le
To check the second implication - i.e. that with concave risk tolerance the age portfolio
pro¿le is upward sloping - we run Tobit regressions of the portfolio share of risky assets
on a second-order polynomial in wealth, age and a set of other controls including city size,
household size, gender, region of residence, education of the head of the household, etc. We
exclude households with zero wealth and those whose head is over 60 since the elderly may
have various incentives to decumulate assets after retirement, particularly the riskier ones.
28
5; As pointed out by Hurd (2000) the portfolio behaviour of retired elderly consumers may be quite different
from that of the non-retired. First, the retired have a limited ability to return to the labor force and to use this
possibility as a buffer against ¿nancial losses. Thislimitation should reduce their willingness to hold risky assets.
Second, the elderly face substantial mortality risk, which increases sharply at advanced old age and leads to a
decline in consumption and wealth. This, in turn, may be re￿ected in the portfolio composition. Third, retired
consumers have large annuity income ￿ows and the risks associated with those ￿ows are quite different from the28
After these exclusions our sample includes 4,799 households. Table 6 shows the results
of theestimatesseparatelywhenriskyassetsaredividedbytotal familywealthandby¿nancial
wealth, respectively. The ¿rst two columns use the whole sample, the last two columns check
the results on the sub-sample of consumers who respond to the lottery question and control
also for risk aversion. All the estimates show that the share of risky assets is mildly increasing
in age, with the portfolio share increasing by 2 percentage points for a 10-year increase in age,
which is consistent with our empirical characterization of absolute risk aversion. With CRRA,
the share of risky assets is independent of the investor’s horizon, hence of age.
8.3 Euler equation estimates
To further check the consistency of our results with observed behavior we follow a third
route. We estimate the value of the parameter q from an Euler equation for consumption under
the assumption that the utility function has the form given by equation (9) in the text and
assuming that consumption is proportional to lifetime wealth.
29 In this case the risk aversion
of the period utility is proportional to that of lifetime utility.
30 Suppose there is no background
risk. Using equation (9) the Euler equation for consumption is
i TE￿V
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￿3q
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￿ ￿ q
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S
￿3q
|
￿ ￿ q
￿n￿|n￿c (14)
where ￿ is the subjective discount factor and ￿|n￿ is an expectational error, orthogonal to all
variables in the information sets of the agents at time t. Thus, we can use these orthogonality
conditionsand estimatetheparameters ofequation (13)using ageneralized method ofmoment
estimator. If we are uncovering true preference parameters we should obtain values of q and
risks of earnings. Finally, the elderly face a much a higher risk of health care consumption than the non-elderly,
which discourages holdings of risky assets. Consistent with this, Guiso and Jappelli (2000) ¿nd that the portfolio
share of risky assets declines with age after retirement.
5< We thank Pierre Andrè Chiappori for suggesting this test.
63 As shown by Tiseno (2002), the risk aversion of lifetime utility, UX+z,> is related to the risk aversion of
period utility Ux+f+z,, by the identity:
Ux+z,@Ux+f+z,,fz>
where fz is the marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime endowment. If the latter is constant in z,t h er i s k
aversion of the period utility is the same as the risk aversion of lifetime utility, apart from a rescaling factor.29
of the implied degree of risk aversion similar to those estimated in the previous sections.
31 To
estimate (14) we rely on the panel component of the SHIW and pool together the observations
for the years 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995. The SHIW has a rotating panel component, where
half of the sample in a given survey is re-interviewed in the subsequent one. Thus, the
maximum number of time periods a household can be present is 4. Since our estimator
is consistent only when the number of observations along the time dimension is large these
results should be regarded as suggestive. Furthermore, as the Euler equation is known not to
hold when credit markets are imperfect, we have excluded those households which are likely
to be liquidity-constrained, according to the same de¿nition we have used earlier. Our sample
consists of an unbalanced panel of about 4,500 households. As a measure of consumption
we use household real expenditure on non-durable goods and services, adjusted for household
size.
32 As a measure of the interest rate we use the return on bank deposits and checking
accounts, which varies over time and across Italian provinces, and impute to each household in
agivenyear andlivingina givenprovince the averagerateprevailinginthat year andprovince.
To account for demographics, we let the parameter V be a function of the age and gender of the
head of the household. Year dummies are also included. As instruments in the agents’ time |
information set, we use the interest rate lagged one and two periods, a categorical variable for
the size of bank deposits, a dummy for the ownership of saving accounts, the herphindal index
of bank concentration in the province, a categorical variable for the size of the town where
the household lives and the population of the province where the town is located. Results, not
shown for brevity, imply a point estimate of the parameter q of 0.1484, which is very close
64 If there is background risk, using the approximate expression for the indirect utility function y,w ec a n
write the Euler equation for consumption as:
x3+fw.4,@￿+4.u,x3+fw, ￿^x333+fw.4, ￿ x333+fw,‘￿5@5.￿w.4
where it has been assumed that the variance of the background risk is time-invariant. Using (9) and letting
|w.4 @h { s + ￿￿
f
4￿￿
w.4
4￿￿ , this condition can be written as:
|w.4 @ ￿+4 . u,|w ￿^￿f
￿￿
w.4+￿f
￿4
w.4 .￿f
￿￿
w.4,|w.4 ￿ ￿f
￿￿
w +￿f
￿4
w .￿f
￿￿
w ,|w‘￿5@5.￿w.4
which again can be estimated by a generalized method of moment estimator.
65 Household per-adult equivalent expenditure is obtained using the following adult equivalence scale: the
head of the household is weighted 1, the other adults in the household are weighted 0.8 and the children are
weighted 0.4.30
to the range of estimates we have obtained from the relationship between our measures of
absolute risk aversion and the consumer endowment.
Overall, we take the evidence in this Section as suggesting that our estimates of the risk
aversion-wealth relation are remarkably consistent with observed behavior. To conclude this
discussion, we note that our empirical characterization of the relation between risk aversion
and wealth also helps to reconcile some portfolio puzzles that have been noticed in the
literature. Simulation models, such as those discussed by Heaton and Lucas (2000), reveal
that portfolio shares of risky assets close to those observed in reality, simultaneously require
three ingredients: a) background risk must be “large”￿ b) it must be positively correlated with
stock market returns￿ c) stock holders must have a high degree of relative risk aversion, 8 in
Heaton and Lucas (2000) simulations. The ¿rst two conditions are met by the rich segment of
the population because they own most of the business wealth which is highly volatile (relative
to labor income) and co-moves with the stock market. If preferences are well described by our
¿ndings, then it is very likely that stockholders have a degree of relative risk aversion close
to that implied by the Heaton and Lucas simulations. In our sample, the relative risk aversion
of the bottom 10 percent of the wealth distribution is 3.7 on average and its consumption is
23.3 million lire ($ 11,500). The consumption of the top 10 percent, who own 61 percent of
total risky assets, is $31,000. Thus for the latter, the predicted degree of relative risk aversion,
holding other characteristics constant (i.e. place of birth, exposure to background risk, etc.),
would be 8.3 (= 3.7￿ ((consumption of the rich/consumption of the poor)f￿H2), close to the
value required by the Heaton and Lucas simulations (2000).
9. Conclusions
In this paper we construct a direct measure of absolute risk aversion using the 1995
Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth. The measure is based on a simple
yet powerful question on the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay to buy a security.
Its main advantage is that it does not rely on any assumption as to the form of individual
utility. As a consequence, it applies not only to the risk-averse, but also to risk-neutral and
risk-prone individuals, providing a point estimate of the degree of risk aversion for each
individual in the sample. This estimate has then been used to gather direct evidence on
the nature of the relationship between individual risk predisposition, on the one hand, and31
individual endowment, demographiccharacteristicsand measures ofuninsurablerisk exposure
and liquidity constraints, on the other.
Our ¿ndings suggest that among risk-averse consumers the degree of absolute risk
aversion is decreasing in individual endowment - thus rejecting CARA preferences - but
the elasticity to consumption is far below the unitary value predicted by the CRRA utility.
Consequently, absolute risk tolerance is a concave function of consumer endowment. How
reasonable is this ¿nding? One way to answer the question is to run the following experiment.
Suppose that a consumer with an annual consumption of 10,000 euros ($10,000, roughly
the 17th percentile) is willing (at most) to pay 250 euros to buy the security. Then, using
equation (6), the implied value of his absolute risk aversion would be 0.3793. Suppose that
relative risk aversion is constant. Then, if our consumer had an annual consumption of 50,000
euros (about the 98th percentile of the distribution) his absolute risk aversion would be 0.0379
(f￿￿HbD ￿ ￿fcfff*Dfcfff￿and he would report a price of 3,100 euros to acquire the security.
This seems an implausibly high ¿gure, very close to the gain offered on the security in the
event of success. Intuitively, the CRRA implies that absolute risk tolerance increases “too
fast” with consumption. If, instead, absolute risk tolerance increases with consumption at the
speed implied by our estimates, the price that the richer consumer would be willing to pay to
buy the security would be 750 euros, a ¿gure that we think is much more reasonable.
As argued, our ¿ndings are also consistent with the empirical evidence that young
households take on relatively less portfolio risk than more mature households. In fact,
according to Gollier and Zeckhauser (1997), the concavity of absolute risk tolerance is a
necessary and suf¿cient condition for such behavior to be optimal.
Individual risk aversion also appears to be characterized by a substantial amount of
unexplained heterogeneity. Consumer attributes and demographic characteristics are of little
help in predicting thedegree ofrisk aversion. Theonly exceptions areeducation and theregion
of birth￿ thelatter is likelyto capture regional differencesin riskpredisposition andculture that
are transmitted with upbringing within the family.
In a world of incomplete markets, individual attitudes towards risk may vary across
households not only because of differences in tastes, but also because of differences in the
environment. We address this issue by analyzing the impact that income uncertainty and
borrowing constraints have on the degree of risk tolerance. We ¿nd unequivocal evidence32
that background risk and borrowing restrictions shape consumers’ attitudes to accepting
risk. One important implication is that imperfections in ¿nancial markets may discourage
entrepreneurship and investment not only because they limit access to external ¿nance but,
more directly, because they discourage individuals from bearing risk.Tables and Figures
Table 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE TOTAL SAMPLE, FOR THE SAMPLE OF
RESPONDENTS AND VARIOUS SUB-SAMPLES
 (The figures for consumption, total wealth and financial wealth are sample medians expressed in
million lire.  The variable “North” includes the following regions:  Piemonte,  Valle  d’Aosta,
Lombardia, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venzia Giulia, Liguria and Emilia Romagna;
“Center” includes Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Abruzzo and Molise and “South” includes
all the remaining regions. The low risk-averse are those who are willing to bet at least 1 million
lire, which is the median of the bet.)
Variable Sample of respondents Total
sample
Risk-averse Risk-
lovers and
neutral
Total
High Low Total
Age 49.24 47.39 48.50 49.34 48.54 54.23
Male % 77.98 81.16 79.24 93.75 79.84 74.35
Years of education 8.76 9.98 9.25 10.81 9.31 8.03
Married % 77.88 79.64 78.58 87.50 78.95 72.50
No. of earners 1.84 1.86 1.85 1.81 1.84 1.80
No. of components 3.23 3.15 3.20 3.00 3.19 2.94
No. of siblings 2.55 2.33 2.46 1.90 2.44 2.50
Area of birth: North 34.44 44.07 38.27 53.90 38.91 37.43
                      Center 23.09 20.18 21.94 19.86 21.85 24.75
                       South 42.47 35.75 39.80 26.24 39.24 37.82
Self-employed % 15.57 20.14 17.38 29.17 17.87 14.23
Public employee % 28.33 26.37 27.55 27.08 27.53 23.26
Value of Z 0.53 3.78 1.82 11.19 2.21 -
Abs. risk aversion 0.189 0.110 0.157 -0.005 0.151 -
Consumption 30.28 34.35 32.00 41.20 32.40 28.80
Financial wealth  9.97 18.10 12.76 49.58 13.42 10.39
Total wealth 154.95 198.47 170.50 329.85 173.25 155.85
N. of observations 1,998 1,316 3,314 144 3,458 8,135Table 2
RISK TOLERANCE, CONSUMPTION AND WEALTH: OLS ESTIMATES
(The left-hand-side variable is the log of absolute risk tolerance; c is expenditure on non-durable
goods; w is total household net worth and is equal to the sum of real wealth (housing, land and
durable goods) and financial wealth net of debt;  fw  is household financial assets;  y is total
household income (excluding asset income). Regressions in columns (2) to (4) include 19
dummies for the region of birth of the head of the household. Age refers to the head of the
household; male is a dummy equal to 1 if the head is a male; junior high school diploma is a
dummy equal to 1 if the head has at least completed eighth grade; siblings is a dummy equal to 1
if the head has any siblings. Father self-employed and public sector employee are two dummies
equal to 1 if the head’s father was self-employed or a public sector employee, respectively. The
standard errors (reported in parentheses) and the tests are computed allowing for estimated
regressors.)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log( c ) 0.0922
(0.0228)
0.0667
(0.0266)
- -
Log( w+y ) - - 0.0296
(0.0097)
-
Log( fw+ y) - - - 0.0745
(0.0145)
Age - 0.0001
(0.0020)
-0.0002
(0.0020)
-0.0016
(0.0020)
Gender - 0.0216
(0.0286)
0.0198
(0.0288)
0.0173
(0.0287)
Junior high school diploma - 0.0701
(0.0337)
0.0699
(0.0339)
0.0647
(0.0340)
Siblings - 0.0145
(0.0229)
0.0178
(0.0230)
0.0216
(0.0228)
Father self-employed - 0.0177
(0.0237)
0.0141
(0.0238)
0.0141
(0.0234)
Father public sector employee - -0.0114
(0.0284)
-0.0120
(0.0285)
-0.0141
(0.0282)
Mills ratio -0.0496
(0.0496)
-0.0061
(0.1261)
-0.0106
(0.1248)
0.0637
(0.1264)
Constant 7.9067
(0.2385)
8.2829
(0.2739)
8.6313
(0.1315)
8.1706
(0.1711)
Region of birth N0 YES YES YES
No. of observations 3,314 3,063 3,044 3,057
Adjusted R
2 0.0166 0.0610 0.0648 0.0766
F test for  b = 1
(p-value)
1,584.01
(0.0000)
1,128,19
(0.0000)
9,912
(0.0000)
4,069.41
(0.0000)
F test for region of birth = 0
(p-value)
- 66.69
(0.0000)
66.92
(0.0000)
59.15
(0.0000)Table 3
RISK TOLERANCE, CONSUMPTION AND WEALTH: IV ESTIMATES
(The left-hand-side variable is the log of absolute risk tolerance; c is expenditure on non-durable
goods; w is total household net worth and is equal to the sum of real wealth (housing, land and
durable goods) and financial wealth net of debt;  fw  is household financial assets;  y is total
household income (excluding asset income). All regressions include 19 dummies for the region of
birth of the head of the household. Age refers to the head of the household; male is a dummy
equal to 1 if the head is a male; junior high school diploma is a dummy equal to 1 if the head has
at least completed the eighth grade; siblings is a dummy equal to 1 if the head has any siblings.
Father self-employed and public sector employee are two dummies equal to 1 if the head’s father
was self-employed or a public sector employee, respectively. The set of instruments includes
dummies for the education and year of birth of the father of the head; measures of windfall gains
(a dummy for the house being acquired as a result of a bequest or gift, insurance settlements and
other transfers, capital gains on the house since the time of acquisition). The estimates in column
(4) are conducted on a restricted sample obtained excluding households with total wealth below
20 million, those who reported non-positive financial assets or non-positive income, those with a
head under 21 years old or over 75. Bootstrapped standard errors (based on 100 replications) are
reported in parentheses.)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log( c ) 0.1549
(0.0605)
. . 0.0858
(0.0651)
Log( w+y ) - 0.0268
(0.0128)
- -
Log( fw+ y) - - 0.1030
(0.0364)
-
Age -0.0018
(0.0014)
-0.0007
(0.0011)
-0.0026
(0.0015)
-0.0009
(0.0017)
Gender 0.0112
(0.0188)
0.0233
(0.0169)
0.0118
(0.0181)
0.0125
(0.0222)
Junior high school diploma 0.0621
(0.0208)
0.0755
(0.0185)
0.0592
(0.0205)
0.0626
(0.0255)
Siblings -0.0084
(0.0209)
-0.0039
(0.0213)
0.0042
(0.0216)
0.0133
(0.0212)
Father self-employed 0.0099
(0.0161)
0.0133
(0.0173)
0.0099
(0.0159)
0.0045
(0.0201)
Father public sector employee -0.0176
(0.0200)
-0.0125
(0.0180)
-0.0175
(0.0215)
-0.0091
(0.0216)
Mills ratio 0.1041
(0.0824)
0.0220
(0.0572)
0.1239
(0.0812)
0.0417
(0.1025)
Constant 7.4137
(0.6086)
8.6627
(0.1428)
7.8762
(0.3842)
8.1278
(0.6584)
Region of birth YES YES YES YES
No. of observations 3,038 3,020 3,032 2,200
Adjusted R
2 0.0522 0.0635 0.0730 0.0509
F test for  b = 1
(p-value)
295.47
(0.0000)
4,406.61
(0.0000)
637.63
(0.0000)
262.13
(0.0000)
F test for region of birth = 0
(p-value)
9.82
(0.0000)
 9.84
(0.0000)
7.33
(0.0000)
8.18
(0.0000)Table 4
RISK TOLERANCE, CONSUMPTION AND WEALTH: 2SLAD ESTIMATES
(The left-hand-side variable is the log of absolute risk tolerance; c is expenditure on non-durable
goods; w is total household net worth and is equal to the sum of real wealth (housing, land and
durable goods) and financial wealth net of debt;  fw  is household financial assets;  y is total
household income (excluding asset income). All regressions include 19 dummies for the region of
birth of the head of the household. Age refers to the head of the household; male is a dummy
equal to 1 if the head is a male; junior high school diploma is a dummy equal to 1 if the head has
at least completed the eighth grade; siblings is a dummy equal to 1 if the head has any siblings.
Father self-employed and public sector employee are two dummies equal to 1 if the head’s father
was self-employed or a public sector employee, respectively. Columns (1) to (3) report 2-stages
LAD estimates. The set of instruments includes dummies for the education and year of birth of
the father of the head; measures of windfall gains (a dummy for the house being acquired as a
result of a bequest or gift, insurance settlements and other transfers, capital gains on the house
since the time of acquisition). Standard errors are reported in parentheses.)
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Log( c ) 0.0654
(0.0307)
- -
Log( w+y ) - 0.0325
(0.0101)
-
Log( fw+y ) - - 0.0774
(0.0252)
Age -0.0002
(0.0004)
-0.0006
(0.0005)
-0.0007
(0.0005)
Gender 0.0023
(0.0130)
0.0006
(0.0132)
-0.0029
(0.0156)
Junior high school diploma 0.0481
(0.0147)
0.0444
(0.0137)
0.0283
(0.0186)
Siblings -0.0075
(0.0137)
-0.0059
(0.0147)
-0.0034
(0.0163)
Father self-employed 0.0030
(0.0105)
0.0015
(0.0113)
0.0007
(0.0123)
Father public sector employee -0.0093
(0.0134)
-0.0088
(0.0142)
-0.0173
(0.0157)
Constant 8.2746
(0.2981)
8.5799
(0.1092)
8.1424
(0.2549)
Region of birth YES YES YES
No. of observations 3,038 3,020 3,032
Pseudo R
2 0.0567 0.0573 0.0571Table 5
RISK TOLERANCE AND BACKGROUND RISK
(The left-hand-side variable is the log of absolute risk tolerance; c is household expenditure on
non-durable goods; w is its net worth and is equal to the sum of real wealth (housing, land and
durable goods) and financial wealth net of debt; fw is its financial assets; y is its total income
(excluding asset income). All regressions include 19 dummies for the region of birth of the head
of the household. Age refers to the head of the household; male is a dummy equal to 1 if the head
is a male; junior high school diploma is a dummy equal to 1 if the head has at least completed the
eighth grade; siblings is a dummy equal to 1 if the head has any siblings. Father self-employed
and public sector employee are two dummies equal to 1 if the head’s father was self-employed or
a public sector employee, respectively. In the first, second and fourth columns background risk is
measured by the estimated variance of the shocks to (log) provincial GDP. In the third and fourth
columns, “liquidity constrained” is a dummy equal to one if the household is highly leveraged,
has relatively few liquid assets or reports having been denied credit. The set of instruments
includes dummies for the education and year of birth of the father of the head; measures of
windfall gains (a dummy for the house being acquired as a result of a bequest or gift, insurance
settlements and other transfers, capital gains on the house since the time of acquisition).
Bootstrapped standard errors (based on 100 replications) are reported in parentheses.)
Variable IV 2SNLLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log( c ) 0.1811
(0.0633)
- 0.1473
(0.0570)
0.1746
(0.0583)
Estimate of b - 0.1335
(0.0391)
-
Variance of shocks to per-capita
GDP
-3.4904
(0.9635)
- - -3.4973
(0.9777)
Dummy for liquidity constraints - - -0.0443
(0.0162)
-0.0311
(0.0166)
Age -0.0019
(0.0015)
-0.0014
(0.0009)
-0.0020
(0.0012)
-0.0020
(0.0013)
Gender 0.0207
(0.0190)
0.0326
(0.0188)
0.0105
(0.0168)
0.0206
(0.0182)
Junior high school diploma 0.0532
(0.0224)
0.0646
(0.0201)
0.0592
(0.0212)
0.0513
(0.0224)
Siblings -0.0056
(0.0210)
-0.0042
(0.0019)
-0.0066
(0.0194)
-0.0043
(0.0212)
Father self-employed 0.0099
(0.0165)
0.0083
(0.0186)
0.0099
(0.0173)
0.0097
(0.0151)
Father public sector employee -0.0211
(0.0205)
-0.0141
(0.0175)
-0.0195
(0.0233)
-0.0224
(0.0198)
Mills ratio 0.0426
(0.0777)
0.0163
(0.0018)
0.1061
(0.0634)
0.0434
(0.0624)
Constant 7.0907
(0.6267)
7.4588
(0.3963)
7.5053
(0.5684)
7.1686
(0.5892)
Region of birth YES NO YES YES
No. of observations 2,840 2,840 3,038 2,840
Adjusted R
2 0.0472 - 0.0558 0.0497
F test for  b = 1
(p-value)
236.58
(0.0000)
- 321.72
(0.0000)
197.48
(0.0000)
F test for region of birth = 0
(p-value)
4.61
(0.0000)
- 7.73
(0.0000)
4.97
(0.0000)Table 6
AGE AND WEALTH PORTFOLIO PROFILES
(In column 1 the left-hand-side variable is the share of risky assets in total wealth; in the second
column it is the portfolio share of risky financial assets. Risky assets include private bonds, stocks
and mutual funds. All regressions are run on the sub-sample of households with under 60 years
old; besides age, wealth and wealth square, they include as explanatory variables household
earnings linear and square, household size and number of earners, dummies for gender, marital
status, education, region of birth and city size dummies.  t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.)
Portfolio share of risky
assets
(Tobit regressions)
Portfolio share of risky
assets
(Tobit regressions)
Variable Whole sample Sample of respondents to the
lottery
Age 0.0021
(0.0008)
0.0052
(0.0020)
0.0016
(0.0011)
0.0061
(0.0026)
w 1.26e-07
(1.69e-08)
- 1.85e-07
(4.68e-08)
-
(w/1000)^
2 -6.81e-09
(1.38e-09)
- -2.82e-08
(1.57e-08)
-
wf - 2.96e-06
(2.26e-07)
- 2.94e-06
(3.26e-07)
(wf/1000)^
2 - -1.23e-06
(1.34e-07)
- -1.14e-06
(1.82e-07)
Absolute risk aversion -597.8
(204.6)
-1,154.8
(486.9)
No. of observations 4,799 4,799 2,458 2,458Figure 1
RISK TOLERANCE AND CONSUMER ENDOWMENT
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6Appendix
The SHIW
The Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) collects detailed
data on demographics, households’ consumption, incomeand balance-sheet items. The survey
was ¿rst run in the mid-1960s but has been available on tape only since 1984. Over time, it
has gone through a number of changes in sample size and design, sampling methodology and
questionnaire. However, sampling methodology, sample size and the broad contents of the
information collected have been unchanged since 1989. Each wave surveys a representative
sample oftheItalian resident population and covers about 8,000 households- although at times
speci¿c parts of the questionnaire are asked to only a random sub-sample. Sampling occurs in
two stages, ¿rst at municipality level and then at household level. Municipalities are divided
into 51 strata de¿ned by 17 regions and 3 classes of population size (more than 40,000, 20,000
to 40,000, less than 20,000). Households are randomly selected from registry of¿ce records.
They are de¿ned as groups of individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption and sharing
the same dwelling. The head of the household is conventionally identi¿ed as the husband,
if present. If instead the person who would usually be considered the head of the household
works abroad or was absent at the time of the interview, the head of the household is taken to
be the person responsible for managing the household’s resources. The net response rate (ratio
of responses to households contacted net of ineligible units) was 57 percent in the 1995 wave.
Brandolini and Cannari (1994) present a detailed discussion of sample design, attrition and
other measurement issues and compare the SHIW variables with the corresponding aggregate
quantities.
De¿nitions of the variables
In the empirical analysis all demographic variables - age, education, gender, number of
brothers and sisters, marital status, region of birth, occupation type and sector - refer to the
head of the household.
Consumption, net worth and ¿nancial wealth: Consumption is the sum of the
expenditure on food, entertainment, education, clothing, medical expenses, housing repairs
and additions, and imputed rents. Net worth is the total of ¿nancial and real assets net of41
household debt. Financial wealth is given by the sum of cash balances, checking accounts,
savings accounts, postal deposits, government paper, corporate bonds, mutual funds and
investmentin fund unitsand stocks. Realassetsinclude investment realestate, businesswealth,
primary residence and the stock of durables.
Discouraged borrowers and rejected loan applicants : The following questions have
been asked in each waveof the survey since1989: “Duringthe year did you or a member of the
household think of applying for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or other ¿nancial intermediary,
but then changed your mind on the expectation that the application would be turned down?”
Those answering yes to this question are classi¿ed as “discouraged borrowers”.T h o s e
answering yes to the following questions are classi¿ed as “rejected” consumers: “During the
year did you or a member of the household apply for a loan or a mortgage to a bank or other
¿nancial intermediary and have it turned down?”
Education of the father of the head of the household : This variable is originally coded
as: no education (0)￿ completed elementary school (5 years)￿ completed junior high school (8
years)￿ completed high school (13 years)￿ completed university (18 years)￿ graduate education
(more than 20 years).
Education of the household head : This variable is originally coded as: no education (0)￿
completed elementary school (5 years)￿ completed junior high school (8 years)￿ completed
high school (13 years)￿ completed university (18 years)￿ graduate education (more than 20
years). We de¿ne three indicators: the ¿rst is equal to 1 when education is up through junior
high school (zero otherwise)￿ the second is equal to 1 when it is through high school (zero
otherwise) and the third is equal to 1 for university or more (zero otherwise).
Income : It is total household after-tax income, excluding asset income.
Indicators of background risk : The variance of shocksto per-capitaGDP in theprovince
of residence is obtained from time series data on per-capita GPD at the province level from
1952 to 1992. For each province we regress the logarithm of per-capita GDP on a linear trend
and compute the variance of the residuals from this regression. We then impute this variance
to all households living in the same province.42
Indicator of liquidity constraints : It is in a dummy variable that allows for discouraged
borrowing and rejected loan applications and for low liquid assets or high indebtness, which
can prevent consumption smoothing in case of unexpected negative income shocks.
Risk aversion : The Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion and the risk attitude
indicators are obtained from a direct question on the hypothetical security. Each survey
participant is offered a hypothetical security and is asked to report the maximum price that
he would be willing to pay in order to buy it. The wording of the lottery question and the
methodology implemented to compute risk aversion are described in the text.
Year of birth of the household head’s father:T h i sv a r i a b l ei su s e dt od e ¿ne ten-year
intervals, starting from 1900. An additional interval is de¿ned for those born in or after 1950.
We then construct six indicators: the ¿rst is equal to one if the household head’s father was
born between 1900 and 1909, the second is one if he was born between 1910 and 1919, and so
on.
Windfall gains measures : Six measures are used. The ¿rst is a dummy for home
ownership as a result of gift or bequest. The second is the sum of the settlements received
related to life(excluding annuities), health and theft and accident insurance. Thethird measure
is the sum of severance payments, unemployment bene¿ts and redundancy allowance. The
fourth is the sum of any additional ¿nancial aid from central or local governments, other
public institutions or charities. The ¿fth consists of gifts/monetary contributions received from
friends or family living outside the household dwelling. The last instrument is a measure of
windfall gains (or losses) on housing constructed using time series data on house prices at
the province level over the years 1965-1994. For homeowners, we compute the house price
change since the year when the house was acquired or since 1965 if it was acquired earlier. To
non-homeowners, we attach the house price change since the year when they started working
or since 1965. This can be justi¿ed on the ground that they start saving to buy a home as soon
as they start working.
Risk aversion of the indirect utility function
Let ￿E￿￿’.￿E￿ n h +￿ denote the indirect utility function, which is assumed to be
differentiable everywhere at least four times. Taking a second order Taylor approximation of43
the right-hand side around the endowment ￿, we can approximate the indirect utility by:
￿E￿￿’￿E￿￿n￿
￿￿E￿￿j
2*2￿
Using the ¿rst and second derivatives of this expression, the degree of absolute risk aversion
of ￿E￿ can be expressed as:
-￿E￿￿’￿
￿￿￿E￿￿
￿￿E￿￿
’ -￿E￿￿
￿
￿n￿￿A￿j2*2
￿n￿￿-￿j2*2
￿
c
where -￿E￿￿’￿
￿￿￿
￿￿ c￿ ￿E￿￿’￿
￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ cA ￿E￿￿’￿
￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ denote, respectively, the degree of
absolute risk aversion, absolute prudence and absolute temperance with respect to the utility
function ￿E￿￿ From the above equation it is clear that, for a prudent consumer, a suf¿cient
condition for (a zero mean) background risk to make him more risk averse is that A￿ :- ￿￿
Let r denote the coef¿cient of variation of the consumer endowment (i.e. r ’
j
￿￿ and
let o￿, R￿ and |￿ denote the degree of relative risk aversion, relative prudence and relative
temperance, respectively (obtained by multiplying the absolute degrees by ￿￿. We can then
rewrite the absolute risk aversion of ￿E￿ as:
-￿E￿￿’-￿E￿￿
￿
￿nR￿|￿r2*2
￿nR￿o￿r2*2
￿
￿
If the utility function is given by (9) in the text, then -￿ ’ &￿3q, o￿ ’ &￿￿3q, R￿ ’ q n o￿,
|￿ ’ q n R￿. Substituting into the above expression for -￿E￿￿ and taking logs we obtain:
*L}-￿ ’* L }& ￿ q*L} ￿ n qR￿r
2c
which shows that the parameter q of the utility function ￿E￿ can be recovered even if there is
background risk.Probit for the probability of answering the question on the security
(The left-hand-side variable is an indicator that is equal to 1 if the household head responds to the
question on the risky security and is willing to invest a positive sum, smaller than 20 million lira.
Columns (2) and (4) report marginal effects. The Mills ratio to control for sample selection in the
regressions for respondents’ risk tolerance is based on the probit in (3) and (4), whose regressors
are exogenous with respect to the attitude towards risk. Household income and wealth are in
million lira. All probit include 19 dummies for the region of birth of the household head. Age
refers to the household head. Junior high school diploma is a dummy equal to 1 if the head has at
least completed the eight grade. Retired head, self-employed head and public sector employee are
dummies reflecting his/her employment status. Inherited house, capital gains on home, insurance
settlements, employment-related benefits, transfers, gifts and other windfall are thought to proxy
to some extent for wealth. Poor understanding is a dummy equal to 1 if, according to the
interviewer, the level of understanding of the questionnaire by the head is poor or just acceptable
(as opposed to satisfactory, good or excellent). Problems in answering is a dummy equal to 1 if,
according to the interviewer, it was difficult for the head to answer questions. Interest is a dummy
equal to 1 if, according to the interviewer, the interest for the questionnaire topics was
satisfactory, good or excellent (as opposed to poor or just acceptable). Truthful is a dummy equal
to 1 if, according to the interviewer, the information regarding income and wealth are reasonably
truthful. Atmosphere is a dummy equal to 1 if, according to the interviewer, the overall climate
when the interview took place was satisfactory or good (as opposed to poor or just acceptable).
The length of the interview is in minutes. Standard errors in parentheses.)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.0129
(0.0072)
-0.0050
(0.0028)
-0.0045
(0.0071)
-0.0017
(0.0028)
Age squared/100 -0.0085
(0.0067)
-0.0033
(0.0026)
-0.0172
(0.0065)
-0.0067
(0.0025)
Gender 0.0532
(0.0391)
0.0206
(0.0151)
0.0948
(0.0364)
0.0367
(0.0140)
Junior high school diploma 0.1597
(0.0378)
0.0618
(0.0146)
0.2129
(0.0355)
0.0862
(0.0136)
Single person household -0.0324
(0.0510)
-0.0126
(0.0197)
Retired household head -0.0546
(0.0491)
-0.0212
(0.0190)
Household income 2.75e-03
(6.07e-04)
1.07e-03
(2.36e-04)
Household net wealth -1.37e-04
(4.07e-05)
-5.35e-05
(1.58e-05)
Self-employed household head 0.1005
(0.0470)
0.0394
(0.0185)
Public sector employee 0.1293
(0.0377)
0.0506
(0.0148)
Inherited house -0.0175
(0.0416)
-0.0068
(0.0161)
Capital gains on home -0.0111
(0.0315)
-0.0043
(0.0122)
Insurance settlements 0.0002
(0.0027)
0.0001
(0.0010)
Employment-related benefits -0.0016 -0.000645
(0.0026) (0.0010)
Transfers -0.0034
(0.0118)
-0.0013
(0.0046)
Gifts 0.0319
(0.0133)
0.0124
(0.0052)
Other windfall gains 0.0023
(0.0061)
0.0009
(0.0024)
Poor understanding -0.0409
(0.0499)
-0.0159
(0.0193)
-0.0586
(0.0497)
-0.0227
(0.0192)
Problems in answering -0.1709
(0.0364)
-0.0660
(0.0139)
-0.1825
(0.0362)
-0.0704
(0.0138)
Interest 0.0261
(0.0440)
0.0101
(0.0170)
0.0275
(0.0439)
0.0107
(0.0170)
Truthful 0.0375
(0.0497)
0.0145
(0.0192)
0.0468
(0.0493)
0.0164
(0.0190)
Atmosphere 0.1124
(0.0452)
0.0433
(0.0173)
0.1138
(0.0451)
0.0439
(0.0172)
Length of the interview 0.0050
(0.0009)
0.0020
(0.0004)
0.0057
(0.0009)
0.0022
(0.0004)
Constant 0.2624
(0.2129)
- 0.0742
(0.2069)
-
Region of birth YES YES YES YES
No. of observations 8,135 - 8,135 -
Pseudo R
2 0.1154 - 0.1124 -References
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